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作者：Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a class of social learning games in which players choose whether and when to make an irreversible investment. We ask whether the option value of learning induces delay. Surprisingly, under natural and standard assumptions, delay does not arise in equilibrium. Although waiting even momentarily would yield informative observations, we show that this learning is payoff-irrelevant. As a result, players either invest immediately or not at all. Lab rat 1: Did you get the COVID vaccine yet? ...
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Theorem 1 in Macho-Stadler et al. (2018) is incorrect. In this note, we correct the theorem by introducing a new axiom, the non-negative payoffs axiom, and adjusting the proof accordingly. We also discuss the implications of this correction for other results presented in the paper.
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作者：Baumann, Leonie
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：A principal must allocate a prize without monetary transfers. She wants to give it to the highest value agent. Agents know their own and their neighbors' values, as determined by a network. Competing for the prize, agents send messages about themselves (applications) and their neighbors (references). They face a limit to lying, so information is partially verifiable. No incentive-compatible mechanism achieves robust implementation. Assigning the prize as a function of best applications and wor...
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作者：Degan, Arianna; Li, Yushen; Xie, Huan
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Jinan University; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We conduct an experiment on a two-player infinitely repeated favor exchange game. In the stage game, each player decides whether to provide a favor to the other player. A favor generates a fixed benefit for the recipient and a cost for the provider, which can be either low or high. We study the situation where this cost is private information and it is efficient to provide a favor only when the cost is low. We address two general questions: 1) To what extent do subjects exchange favors in ways...
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作者：Avalos-Trujillo, Luis
摘要：Upstream reciprocity, known colloquially as pay-it-forward, is reciprocating an act of kindness to an unrelated third party. Negative upstream reciprocity means reciprocating an unkind act to an unrelated third party. The present research proposes an experimental test of upstream reciprocity and contrast between its two forms. Survey questions on trust and gratitude complement the study. Results show evidence of positive upstream reciprocity but against its negative counterpart. Subjects pay f...
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作者：Duggan, John; Forand, Jean Guillaume
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Waterloo
摘要：We study electoral accountability in a dynamic environment with complete information. As our normative benchmark, we take the solution of the dynamic programming problem facing the representative voter as if he chose policy directly. There always exist equilibria in which the congruent politician type, whose policy preferences match those of the voter, is accountable, in the sense that these politicians achieve the idealized benchmark. We demonstrate that challenges to electoral accountability...
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作者：Ballard, Joe S.; Boosey, Luke
作者单位：Skidmore College; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study dynamic coordination with costly switching, where players are initially uncertain regarding how to coordinate. We model two players searching for compatible platforms in the presence of two kinds of frictions: noisy outcomes and costly switching. The model predicts that players remain on their current platforms whenever their common belief is sufficiently optimistic; otherwise, they randomize their actions, switching with higher probability whenever they are more pessimistic about com...
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作者：Bergantinos, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
摘要：We study the problem of measuring the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms. We uncover the space of popularity indices upon exploring the implications of several axioms capturing principles with normative appeal. As a result, we characterize several families of indices. Our characterizations might help to address the rising concern in the music industry to explore new methods that reward artists (from the revenues platforms raise by charging users) more appropriately. We actually...
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作者：Goette, Lorenz; Han, Hua-Jing; Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：We show that greater memory overload results in a disproportionately greater underreaction to belief-challenging information compared to belief-confirming information. In an experiment, we keep constant the information subjects receive but vary the difficulty of memorizing the signals. In the treatment condition, the preceding signal disappears as the next signal appears; in the control condition, the preceding signal remains visible. Memory load is therefore greater in the treatment than in t...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study optimal mechanisms for a data broker selling market segmentation to a producer. The producer engages in discriminatory pricing and is privately informed about a payoff-relevant parameter. We first characterize a class of markets from which the segmentations in optimal mechanisms can be constructed. If the profit-maximizing prices of different producer types are ordered and only downward or only upward incentive constraints bind, this analysis shows that in any created market either al...
