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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Cornell University; California Institute of Technology
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作者：Grosser, Jens; Giertz, Thorsten
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Cologne
摘要：We experimentally study pork barrel politics in repeated two-candidate majoritarian elections with costly voting. Candidates form distinct supporter groups by favoring some voters in budget spending and ignoring others. Relative to compulsory voting, voluntary voting induces on average larger, more narrowly targeted favors and therefore more inequality among otherwise identical voters. Against our prediction, candidate participants tend to cultivate policy polarization by repeatedly favoring t...
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作者：Martinelli, Cesar; Esandi, Naila C. Sebastian
作者单位：George Mason University; George Mason University; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
摘要：We propose a model of electoral accountability, and we test it in a lab setting. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to deter politicians from accepting bribes early in their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives perform worse in encouraging good initial behavior among politicians, but are more effective in promoting good behavior later on. The probability of voter errors and politicians' intrinsic motivation for good behavior in t...
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作者：Kwon, Hyukjun; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study priority-based matching markets. We propose a novel partial order for comparing matching mechanisms in terms of their fairness. Using this order, we show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ markets. Restricting attention to strategypro...
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作者：Chandan, Rahul; Paarporn, Keith; Kovenock, Dan; Alizadeh, Mahnoosh; Marden, Jason R.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado at Colorado Springs; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：Can intentionally decreasing one's own competitive abilities provide strategic benefits in adversarial environments? We investigate whether a competitor can gain an advantage by conceding valuable assets to an opponent under a well studied framework known as General Lotto games. While intuition suggests this cannot be done, we demonstrate that concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. We explore concessions in two settings: 1) General Lotto games, which depict 1-vs.-1 advers...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
作者单位：Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Naono, Miharu
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.
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作者：Bardal, Tuva; Endriss, Ulle
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Approval-based scoring rules require participants to submit ballots that correspond to the candidates they approve of, and each candidate then receives some score from each ballot it appears on. One particularly natural class of approval-based scoring rules is the class of size-approval rules. For rules in this class, each ballot is weighted based on the number of candidates it contains. We provide a deep axiomatic analysis of the class of size-approval rules and related classes of approval-ba...
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作者：Deng, Xiaotie; Gafni, Yotam; Lavi, Ron; Lin, Tao; Ling, Hongyi
作者单位：Peking University; Weizmann Institute of Science; University of Bath; Harvard University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are domin...
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作者：Jiao, Qian; Kuang, Zhonghong; Liu, Yiran; Yu, Yang
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; China University of Petroleum
摘要：This paper investigates the effort-maximizing design of multi-stage contests with tree-like architectures, focusing on both contest architecture and prize structure. Given the architecture, we show that the whole budget should be assigned to a single match. This match must be the final if the architecture is symmetric. Moreover, the winner-take-all rule proves to be optimal if the contest organizer can jointly design the architecture and prize structure. To determine the optimal contest archit...
