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作者：Falvey, Rod; Lane, Tom; Luckraz, Shravan
作者单位：Bond University; Newcastle University - UK; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves effi...
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作者：Drouvelis, Michalis; Grosskopf, Brit
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Exeter
摘要：The ability to punish free-riders has been shown to sustain cooperation in social dilemma games. Those that engage in costly punishment are often those that are angry at observed contributions of their fellow group members. This paper abstracts from the effect of integral (i.e., related to the situation) emotions and explicitly studies the effect of incidental (i.e., unrelated to the situation) emotions. By inducing either positive or negative emotions we can causally investigate the effect of...
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作者：Busettoa, Francesca; Codognatoa, Giulio; Ghosalc, Sayantan; Julienb, Ludovic; Turchet, Damiano
作者单位：University of Udine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Glasgow; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. In the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we partially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without affecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with ...
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作者：Ishida, Wataru; Park, Changwoo
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called within-group endowments lower bounds, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-p...
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作者：Ozerturk, Saltuk; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Duke University
摘要：We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, orga...
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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A natural way of quantifying the amount of information in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.
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作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.; Ellis, Keaton
作者单位：University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Monash University
摘要：Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through lottery integration. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic ...
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作者：Berman, Ron; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price el...
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作者：Protopappas, Konstantinos; Rietzke, David
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Lancaster University
摘要：We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-b...
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作者：Jang, Inkee; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Hanyang University; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We examine resource allocation in the context of the capability approach with multi-dimensional human functioning outputs. We aim to provide an egalitarian foundation for human development indices (HDIs) using Parfit's (1997) priority principle, which says that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, he should receive more resources. An HDI-egalitarian rule allocates resources in such a way that all individuals attain an equal HDI-index value. Using the priority principle or its ...
