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作者：Kocak, Korhan
作者单位：IE University
摘要：Parties in primary elections often choose between candidates who appeal to their base and those who appeal to the broader electorate. I present a model of primaries where incumbents can exploit this trade-off the opposition faces between ideological congruence and electability. In the model, incumbents reduce their appeal to the median voter by moving away from the center. In doing so, they provoke the opposition into nominating extremists, improving their reelection prospects. This mechanism ...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Shaiderman, Dimitry
作者单位：Durham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper examines information transmission games where the sender knows the realizations of states from a Markov process, but his informational advantage is counteracted by outside, random revelations to the receiver. For very patient players, we characterize the sender's value of the game with outside revelations in terms of the value without outside revelations. Through our characterization, we identify that, in contrast with the sender-receiver games with fixed states, the sender may bene...
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作者：Manocha, Kriti; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity c...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Khan, Abhimanyu
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of...
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作者：Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII; Lancaster University
摘要：We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent...
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作者：Sekeris, Petros G.
摘要：In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. ...
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作者：Saas, Scott
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper explores which correlated equilibrium outcomes are robust to players having the option to publicly and verifiably disclose their private information before playing the game. I focus on outcomes that are disclosure-proof: those that can be induced such that no player is incentivized to disclose their signal. Since signals in this environment do not carry payoff-relevant information, disclosing only limits the ability to coordinate agents off-path. I show that an outcome is disclosure...
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作者：Li, Xueheng
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Sun Yat Sen University
摘要：Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fi...
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作者：Chuan, Amanda; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally investigate psychological motivations behind pay-it-forward behavior. We construct a psychological game-theoretic model that incorporates altruism, inequity aversion, and indirect reciprocity following Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). We test this model using games in which players choose to give to strangers, potentially after receiving a gift from an unrelated benefactor. Our experiment reveals that altruism an...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen, V
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The ability of larger markets to mitigate the incentive problem created by private information has been the focus of a sizable economics literature. In contrast, the fact that thicker markets also reduce the double coincidence of wants problem has received little attention. Modeling thin markets as bilateral trade involving independent private values and thick markets as Walrasian markets with a continuum of traders, we analyze and quantify the matching benefits of market thickness. These bene...
