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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the...
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作者：Myatt, David P.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In a war of attrition a player's perceived strength is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength...
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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki
作者单位：Keio University; Hosei University
摘要：We consider many-to-many matching with contracts where each agent can sign multiple contracts with the same agent. In other words, the unitarity condition is not assumed in this model. We offer a weaker substitutability condition called substitutability across doctors, which is a generalization of unilateral substitutability. We show that if every hospital's choice function satisfies substitutability across doctors and every doctor's choice function is responsive, then a stable outcome exists....
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Ramos, Paulo
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism in which every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium induces outcomes specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed-strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We define compelling Nash implementation as a case where the implementing mechanism possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium that strictly Pareto dominates any undesired mixed-strat...
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作者：Gerasimou, Georgios
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：We propose an experimental design and data-analytic method for eliciting and distinguishing the strict-preference, indifference, and indecisiveness components of individual preferences in general choice environments. The design combines a forced-choice treatment with a free-choice treatment. In both treatments, subjects may select multiple alternatives from a menu. In the free-choice treatment, subjects may also avoid or delay choice at a small expected cost. To analyze such data, we extend a ...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Seel, Christian
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop and extend notions of potentials for normal-form games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to present a unified approach for the general class of social environments. The different potentials and corresponding social environments can be ordered in terms of their permissiveness. We classify different methods to construct potentials and we characterize potentials for matching problems, vote trading, multilateral trade, TU games, and various pillage games.
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Ozbilen, Seckin
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ozyegin University
摘要：We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into friends and enemies such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends. We sho...
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作者：Kogan, Shimon; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：Reichman University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Zurich
摘要：Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing-documented for beliefs about individual outcomes-affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, ...
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作者：Kivinen, Steven
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. Strong robust group strategy-proofness typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe t...
