-
作者：Wang, Han
作者单位：Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space. The cost is information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still the same optimal outcome if and o...
-
作者：Bils, Peter; Izzo, Federica
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We study strategic policy experimentation by an incumbent politician when voters care about both policy and the candidates' valence. In our model, the voter does not know the location of her ideal policy and learns via experience, in turn, the officeholder uses policymaking to control voter learning. The incumbent thus faces a trade-off between implementing a policy close to his own ideal point, or one that induces the optimal amount of voter learning to win reelection. In equilibrium, how the...
-
作者：Bizzarri, Matteo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Siena; Bocconi University
摘要：We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rat...
-
作者：Shinozaki, Hiroki
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider an object reallocation problem with transfers. We show that if a rule satisfies endowments-swapping-proofness, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and non-imposition, then the rule coincides with the top trading cycles rule without transfers (TTC without transfers). Thus, even when transfers among agents are allowed, no transfers occur under such a rule, not even in the form of fixed prices.
-
作者：Dong, Wanxin; Zheng, Jiakun
作者单位：East China University of Science and Technology; Renmin University of China; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Prior work finds that individuals are often less prosocial when they can exploit uncertainty as an excuse. In contrast to prior work that largely explores the relevance of excuses in the gain domain, this paper investigates the relevance of excuses in both the loss and gain domains. In our laboratory experiment, participants evaluated risky payoffs for themselves and their partners in either the gain or loss domain, with or without interpersonal trade-offs. We found that participants exhibited...
-
作者：Park, In-Uck; Smyrniotis, Efthymios
作者单位：University of Bristol; Economic & Social Research Institute (ESRI); Trinity College Dublin; Trinity College Dublin
摘要：We extend global games & agrave; la Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to environments where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected even if there is no dominance solvable game in the underlying class of games. Strict dominance can emerge in the global game from strategic uncertainty due to discrete payoff changes in underlying games, and we provide sufficient conditions on payoff changes that warrant iterated dominance of the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, strategic uncertainty creates strictl...
-
作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Dur, Umut; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yilmaz, Ozgur
作者单位：Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence MBZUAI; North Carolina State University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Koc University
摘要：In school choice problems, the pursuit of student welfare (efficiency) is constrained by the requirement to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among fair matchings, even the welfare maximizing one, the Student-Optimal Stable Matching (SOSM), is inefficient. Moreover, any mechanism that yields welfare gains over the SOSM is manipulable by students. This paper investigates the fairness and incentive properties of efficient mechanisms. We compare matchings using the notion that one matching ...
-
作者：Hsu, Chin-Chia; Ajorlou, Amir; Jadbabaie, Ali
摘要：In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of sharing decisions among users of a Twitter-like social network. Agents have a subjective prior on an unobservable real-valued state, representing their beliefs on a topic that is subject to a binary action. Agents cast their binary action, matching the sign of the state. Before the action stage, a small fraction of agents receive a piece of news which impacts their beliefs. Those who receive the news update their belief and make a decision as...
-
作者：Abe, Takaaki
作者单位：Kyushu University
摘要：We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is stable for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some committee members obtains k or more affirmative votes, then the new threshold replaces the current one. Assuming that each member has preferences for the set of possible thresholds, we analyze which threshold m...
-
作者：Goel, Sumit
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests, i.e., contests with greater inequality across prizes. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributi...
