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作者：Asulin, Yamit; Heller, Yuval; Munichor, Nira; Zultan, Ro'i
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Bar Ilan University
摘要：People behave more pro-socially when observed by others. We develop a theoretical model incorporating social distance between agent and observer and test its predictions in a field experiment with 670 high-school students. The experiment manipulated the observer's identity (friend, acquaintance, or none) and capped personal rewards. Observability increased effort, and personal rewards enhanced above-threshold effort when effort was observable. Among young adolescents, these effects were strong...
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作者：Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Peter
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：A sender wants to make a public announcement to three receivers but she cannot. The Byzantine agreement communication protocol (Lamport et al., 1982) prescribes that the sender instead sends the same private message to the receivers who in turn forward to each other the message they have received from the sender. Let the receivers consider the (bitwise) majority of their received messages as a pseudo public message of the sender. We show that this protocol, besides being 1resilient, substitute...
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作者：Jiao, Peiran; Nax, Heinrich H.; Zong, Jichuan
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Information in repeated real-world interactions is rarely fixed. Instead, over time, players typically learn more about the game structure, understand more about their own payoff correspondences, and find out what others did and earned in the past. However, how this dynamic information path influences learning and which aggregate outcomes are reached as a result have not been investigated to date. To study this, we conducted a series of laboratory experimental games where we provided more info...
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作者：Li, King King; Suzuki, Toru
作者单位：Hang Seng University of Hong Kong; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：This paper investigates the role of uninformed agents in information aggregation. A group of agents, who may or may not have private information about the state, communicate through a specific communication format and vote to make the correct decision-one that matches an unobservable state-based on majority rule. We analyzed efficient equilibria under simultaneous and sequential communication formats and tested these predictions in the laboratory. When all agents were informed, information was...
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作者：Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We study sequential processes where agents create value through costly and uncertain investments, with success triggering further investment decisions by others. Our paper focuses on designing optimal allocation rules that distribute the total value generated among agents, balancing the recognition of past contributions with incentives for future investments. We prove the existence of equilibrium in the game induced by any such rule and identify a unique investment profile that maximizes the o...
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作者：Cheng, Xiaoyu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous informa...
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作者：Kizilkale, Can; Rodriguez, Anthony; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Safi, Shahir
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I consider environments where an upwardly-biased expert faces both costs of acquiring information and of transmitting inaccurate information relative to the realized state (forecasting error) when advising a decision-maker. While existing models study these costs separately, I show that considering them jointly can substantially alter standard results. Introducing costly information acquisition overturns the partial-communication and language-inflation predictions of models with bounded messag...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer's budget constraint. Any such Random Performance Function (RPF) satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents' effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove ...
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作者：Li, Minming; Lu, Pinyan; Sha, Xingchen; Yao, Yuhao; Zhang, Jialin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Northwestern University; Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute of Computing Technology, CAS
摘要：In this paper, we study the two-facility location games with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with an approximation ratio of 1 + 2 alpha, where alpha is the approximation ...
