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作者：Garg, Jugal; Tao, Yixin; Vegh, Laszlo A.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Bonn; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is maximal. When agents have homogeneous concave utility functions, these concepts coincide: the classical Eisenberg-Gale convex program that maximizes Nash welfare over feasible allocations yields a competitive equilibrium. However, they diverge for non-homogene...
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作者：Kovenock, Dan; Song, Jian; Trevisan, Francesco
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; Oklahoma City University; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This article examines, both theoretically and experimentally, the welfare implications of implementing symmetric bid caps in lobbying competitions. We model lobbying games as lottery contests with two radicals and one centrist, where all players strictly prefer to win. However, if they lose, radicals prefer to lose to a centrist rather than to the opposing radical. We establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and find that, in the absence of a bid cap, radicals may bid aggressively...
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作者：Nakamura, Kensei
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, the Pareto principle leads to an impossibility result unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering the aggregation of a general class of incomplete preferences that can represent gradual ambiguity perceptions. Our result shows that the planner cannot avoid ignoring some individuals unless there is a probability distribution that all individuals agree is m...
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作者：Kambhampati, Ashwin
摘要：Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information structures such that two information structures are close if and only if (approximate) equilibrium payoffs are close. However, Monderer and Samet (1996) fix a common prior and define their topology on profiles of partitions over a state space, whereas Kajii and Mo...
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作者：Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Xu, Haifeng; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a regulator. We consider both the case of a risk-neutral and of a risk-averse agent, focusing mainly on a setting with a limited liability assumption. We provide a clean characterization for implementability of actions and utility profiles by any information str...
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作者：Song, Jian; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Oklahoma City University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; George Mason University
摘要：We extend the war of attrition by studying three-period dynamic contest games. In our game, players can either fight against their opponents at the last period or can fight at any period. Waiting is costly. We focus on the role of waiting costs and show that the value of waiting costs is a key factor in determining the type of equilibrium in such dynamic contests. Specifically, when players are allowed to fight only at the last period, as waiting costs increase, contests end earlier, battles a...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Sternal, Philipp
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Paris School of Economics; University of Zurich
摘要：We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects r...
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作者：Kasberger, Bernhard; Martin, Simon; Normann, Hans-Theo; Werner, Tobias
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Vienna; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society; Maynooth University; University of Southampton
摘要：Reinforcement learning algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, and the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We compare human and algorithmic cooperation rates in the infinitely repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma and study which strategies they choose to cooperate and punish deviations. Through a sequence of computational Q-learning and human-player experiments, we find that our Q-learning algorithms tend...
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作者：Gibbs, Daniel; Judd, Gleason
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a policy-motivated principal choosing a representative to bargain over one-dimensional policy in a collective body under majority rule. The representative's ideology affects policy outcomes directly through their own proposal and indirectly by shaping the median's expectations, determining which proposals pass. This creates a tradeoff: a representative close to the principal's ideal point makes favorable proposals but permits extremist proposals to pass, while a more centrist represen...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Lederer, Patrick; Lu, Xinhang; Suzuki, Mashbat; Vollen, Jeremy
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to some candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introduce the maximum payment rule (MP). Under this rule, each voter controls a part of the budget and, in each step, the corresponding voters allocate their entire budget to the candidate approved by the largest number of voters with nonzero budget. We show th...
