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作者：Calleja, Pedro; Llerena, Francesc
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.
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作者：Brooksby, Austin; Meyer, Jacob; Rentschler, Lucas; Smith, Vernon; Spofford, Robbie
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Smith and Wilson (2018) argue that behavior in the ultimatum game may be due to the typical implementation, in which players are not given the opportunity to opt out of the game. Using insights from Smith (1759), they suggest that making play voluntary would increase rates of equilibrium play. They conducted an augmented ultimatum game where the responder first decides whether to participate, and compare their experimental data to stylized facts from the literature, reporting far higher rates ...
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作者：Kopsacheilis, Orestis; van Dolder, Dennie; Isler, Ozan
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Munich; University of Essex; University of Queensland
摘要：Conditional cooperation is typically studied in experimental settings where the behavior of others is known to subjects. In this study, we examine conditional cooperation under uncertainty. Using a novel experimental design, we exogenously manipulate the likelihood that a subject's partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma will cooperate. Information about the partner's cooperation is either presented descriptively or learned through experiential sampling. We observe a description-experience gap: subjec...
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作者：Freer, Mikhail; Friedman, Daniel; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Barcelona; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：Why do some investors delegate financial decisions to supposed experts? We report an on-line experiment designed to disentangle four possible motives. About 800 investors drawn from the Prolific subject pool choose whether or not to delegate a real-stakes choice among lotteries to a previous investor (a designee) after seeing information on the performance of several available designees. We find that a surprisingly large fraction of investors delegate even trivial choice tasks, suggesting a ma...
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作者：Noguchi, Mitsunori
作者单位：Meijo University
摘要：This note challenges the belief that mining processes are too complex for traditional game-theoretic analysis. We provide Nash-like equilibrium solutions for two-player gap games, focusing on the strategic delay of mining rig activation in Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work (PoW) system. By delaying activation, miners can optimize profits, particularly as transaction fees become a more significant portion of their revenues (Carlsten et al., 2016). Building on the game-theoretic model of Tsabary and Eyal ...
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作者：Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present players create worth today, but the way these players organize also affects the future: their partition imposes externalities that influence the worth of coalitions formed by future players. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and explore their implications. They are not sufficient to uniquely determine a value. We propose two solution concep...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Madmon, Omer; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Toronto
摘要：We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a 1 epsilon-fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：An advisor discloses evidence about an object to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or the profitability of its sale (the advisor's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules that balance two goals: maximizing the overall probability of sale, and steering sales from lower-to higher-profitability objects. I consider the implications of a regulation that forces the advisor to always reveal her motives to the buyer. I show that whether such policies induce the advisor t...
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作者：Bei, Xiaohui; Liu, Shengxin; Lu, Xinhang
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Harbin Institute of Technology; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resources. In this paper, we propose and study a new model for fair division in which agents have their own subjective divisibility over the goods to be allocated. That is, some agents may find a good to be indivisible and get utilities only if they recei...
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作者：Walker-Jones, David
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：By weakening Shannon's original axioms to allow for attributes of the choice environment to differ in their associated learning costs, this paper provides an axiomatic foundation for Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy, a natural multi-parameter generalization of Shannon Entropy. Sufficient conditions are also provided for a simple dataset that provides a closed-form solution for the Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy cost function for information by analyzing stochastic choice data produced by a rat...
