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作者：HURKENS, S
摘要：A product set of pure strategies is said to be closed under best replies if all best replies against all possible mixtures of these strategies are contained in the set. Minimal sets with this property are called minimal curb sets. This paper presents a dynamic learning process that has two main characteristics: Players have a bounded memory and they play best replies against beliefs, formed on the basis of strategies used in the recent past. It is shown that this learning process leads the pla...
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作者：BOMZE, IM; WEIBULL, JW
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：A central concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy. However, many games of interest for economics have only strategies which meet the weaker requirement of neutral stability. While neutral stability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics in pairwise interactions, we give here an example in which an evolutionarily stable strategy is not Lyapunov stable in a more general context. We propose to use instead the notions of (strong) uninvadab...
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作者：CHENG, LK; ZHU, M
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties an have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility. In contrast, players with ''quadratic utility'' have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield i...
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作者：CANNINGS, C; WHITTAKER, JC
作者单位：University of Reading
摘要：The classical War of Attrition (Bishop and Cannings, 1978) is a pairwise conflict in which the individual willing to compete longer wins. Participation incurs a cost increasing with the length of the contest. We consider a population playing successive contests within a fixed time. An individual picks an integer length of time which is used throughout the whole time. The individuals pair at random at time zero, and at each integer time those individuals whose contests end immediately are repai...
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作者：ROTH, AE; EREV, I
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior in all three games, even tho...
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作者：NOWAK, MA; SIGMUND, K
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Computer simulations have shown that mutation-selection processes frequently lead to the establishment of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. To simplify the mathematical analysis, it has usually been assumed that the interaction is repeated infinitely often. Here, we consider the finitely repeated case. Using renewal equations, we derive analytic results on the adaptive dynamics of monomorphic populations evolving in trait-space, describe the cooperation-rewarding zone and specify...
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作者：BINMORE, KG; SAMUELSON, L; VAUGHAN, R
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies. If the population size is sufficiently large, then the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the behavior of the system over finite time periods. The limiting behavior of the process is captured by combinatorial techniques introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell and popularized by Young and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob. We find c...
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作者：BOMZE, IM; BURGER, R
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Evolutionary game dynamics of mixed-strategy distributions typically exhibits continua of stationary states. We introduce a dynamical model of mutation in evolutionary games, in which all possible mixtures of n pure strategies are admitted. Although mutation generates random variability, its effect on the dynamics is to dissolve continua of neutrally stable equilibria into isolated, asymptotically stable ones. Unbeatability, i.e., uniform neutral stability, of strategies is related to the dyna...
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作者：CRESSMAN, R
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：Static stability conditions are developed for evolutionary games that involve two groups of individuals such as the evolution of frequencies in a two-species biological system. These conditions are related to a local version of the Pareto optimal solution concept. Solutions that satisfy these conditions are shown to be dynamically stable for the replicator dynamic. The theory is applied to a mate desertion model where the two groups (male and female) have two possible desertion times. In parti...
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作者：SIGMUND, K; YOUNG, HP
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
