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作者：Ketelaars, Martijn W.; Borm, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：This article introduces the concept of duality in financial networks, which entails the division of losses versus gains. In bankruptcy problems, in which a bankrupt entity divides its non-negative assets among a group of claimants, duality is well understood. Financial networks generalize bankruptcy problems by allowing for multiple agents with individual assets interconnected by mutual claims. We argue that allowing for negative assets is imperative to adequately formulate duality for financi...
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作者：Mantovani, Marco; Filippin, Antonio
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Milan; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In prediction markets, prices can be interpreted as the average belief of the traders under restrictive theoretical assumptions, i.e. specific risk preferences and the Prior Information Equilibrium. The validity of these assumptions depends on the specific market institution and on the composition of the market in terms of risk preferences. In this paper we test in a laboratory experiment the main elements that should affect the distance between prices and average beliefs, manipulating the mar...
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作者：Kishishita, Daiki; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.
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作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Risma, Eliana Pepa
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism -which is either stable or individually rational and Paretodominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism-, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on obvious manipulations and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. ...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.; Chakraborty, Anujit
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. A minority of subjects (15%) produce precise Bayesian reports, while an additional 59% of subjects produce unbiased reports even when exposed to polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of info...
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作者：Foo, Ki Vin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that the converse does not hold under unawareness without restricting the evolution of the player's awareness to constant awareness along paths of play. Both directions of Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness require a condition comple...
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作者：Lillethun, Erik
作者单位：Colgate University
摘要：In evolutionary game theory, when a population of players with the same preferences may freely choose a location in which to interact with other players, previous literature has shown that long-run evolutionary forces select in favor of payoff-dominant equilibria. In this paper, I extend this location choice aspect of evolutionary game theory to the case of two different payoff types of players in 2 & times; 2 games. I show that whether or not payoff-dominant equilibrium selection occurs depen...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Harrison, Rodrigo; Jara-Moroni, Pedro
作者单位：University of Iowa; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Universidad de Santiago de Chile
摘要：We propose a global games approach to the standard two-stage entry game. The entry decisions in the first stage are strategic substitutes. The second-stage game of product market competition reflects a fundamental common value market attractiveness parameter, about which firms get private noisy signals. The main result establishes the selection of a unique equilibrium in the entry game, as noise vanishes, in cut-off strategies implying efficient entry. This provides a theoretical foundation fo...
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, Mwinning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compa...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.; Brown, Alexander L.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper introduces a refinement of Nash equilibrium (NE) to determine the relevance of weakly dominated NE in games. We adapt Harsanyi (1973)'s concept of approachability, originally based on games with randomly disturbed payoffs, and extend it to a broader family that encompasses the most widely used equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior. We identify a singular NE refinement, approximate payoff monotone equilibrium (APME), that coincides with the set of NE that are approachab...
