THE FINITE-HORIZON WAR OF ATTRITION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CANNINGS, C; WHITTAKER, JC
署名单位：
University of Reading
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1049
发表日期：
1995
页码：
193-236
关键词：
摘要：
The classical War of Attrition (Bishop and Cannings, 1978) is a pairwise conflict in which the individual willing to compete longer wins. Participation incurs a cost increasing with the length of the contest. We consider a population playing successive contests within a fixed time. An individual picks an integer length of time which is used throughout the whole time. The individuals pair at random at time zero, and at each integer time those individuals whose contests end immediately are repaired to fight a new contest. Partial results on the nature of the evolutionary stable strategy are given together with numerical studies. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.