DOES NEUTRAL STABILITY IMPLY LYAPUNOV STABILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BOMZE, IM; WEIBULL, JW
署名单位：
Stockholm School of Economics
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1048
发表日期：
1995
页码：
173-192
关键词：
摘要：
A central concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy. However, many games of interest for economics have only strategies which meet the weaker requirement of neutral stability. While neutral stability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics in pairwise interactions, we give here an example in which an evolutionarily stable strategy is not Lyapunov stable in a more general context. We propose to use instead the notions of (strong) uninvadability and (strong) unbeatability, refinements of evolutionary and neutral stability, respectively. Strong uninvadability implies asymptotic stability, and strong unbeatability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.