MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM BASED UPON EXPECTED UTILITY AND QUADRATIC UTILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CHENG, LK; ZHU, M
署名单位：
State University System of Florida; University of Florida
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1011
发表日期：
1995
页码：
139-150
关键词：
摘要：
The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties an have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility. In contrast, players with ''quadratic utility'' have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.