MUSICAL CHAIRS - MODELING NOISY EVOLUTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BINMORE, KG; SAMUELSON, L; VAUGHAN, R
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1039
发表日期：
1995
页码：
1-35
关键词：
摘要：
We examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies. If the population size is sufficiently large, then the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the behavior of the system over finite time periods. The limiting behavior of the process is captured by combinatorial techniques introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell and popularized by Young and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob. We find conditions under which the limiting distribution selects the risk-dominant equilibrium in a 2 x 2 game and conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.