INVASION DYNAMICS OF THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NOWAK, MA; SIGMUND, K
署名单位：
University of Vienna
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1055
发表日期：
1995
页码：
364-390
关键词：
摘要：
Computer simulations have shown that mutation-selection processes frequently lead to the establishment of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. To simplify the mathematical analysis, it has usually been assumed that the interaction is repeated infinitely often. Here, we consider the finitely repeated case. Using renewal equations, we derive analytic results on the adaptive dynamics of monomorphic populations evolving in trait-space, describe the cooperation-rewarding zone and specify when unconditional defectors can invade. Tit for tat plays an essential, but transient, role in the evolution of cooperation. A large part of the paper considers the case when players make their moves not simultaneously, but alternatingly. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.