STABILITY BY MUTATION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BOMZE, IM; BURGER, R
署名单位：
University of Vienna
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1995.1047
发表日期：
1995
页码：
146-172
关键词：
摘要：
Evolutionary game dynamics of mixed-strategy distributions typically exhibits continua of stationary states. We introduce a dynamical model of mutation in evolutionary games, in which all possible mixtures of n pure strategies are admitted. Although mutation generates random variability, its effect on the dynamics is to dissolve continua of neutrally stable equilibria into isolated, asymptotically stable ones. Unbeatability, i.e., uniform neutral stability, of strategies is related to the dynamic behavior under mutation, which is used to characterize the Nash condition. Simple conditions on the payoff ensuring global stability are specified, and the case of n = 2 pure strategies is investigated in detail. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.