-
作者：Friedman, JW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
-
作者：Laussel, D; Le Breton, M
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient e...
-
作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a noncooperative linking game leading to the formation of cooperation structures. They asked whether it is possible for a simple game to have a stable structure in which no coalition forms, i.e., in which the cooperation graph is not internally complete but is connected and stable. We answer this question affirmatively; specifically, we present a simple proper weighted majority game with a connected incomplete structure, and we prove it to be stable under any ...
-
作者：van Damme, E; Aumann, R
-
作者：Segendorff, B
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Two principals (nations) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on th...
-
作者：Friedman, JW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
-
作者：Samet, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We observe that the set of all priors of an agent is the convex hull of his types. A prior common to all agents exists if the sets of the agents' priors have a point in common, We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the intersection of several closed convex subsets of the simplex, which is an extension of the separation theorem. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of common prior is a special case of this. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者：Friedman, JW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
-
作者：Oechssler, J
摘要：A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For...
-
作者：Somanathan, E
摘要：Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
