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作者：McLennan, A; Park, IU
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Bristol
摘要：The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1997), Games Econ. Behav. 21, 148-160, who arrives at this result by referring to the enumeration of Grunbaum and Sreedharan (1967), J. Combin. Theory 2, 437-465, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agent...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Lerner, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Open University Israel
摘要：This paper deals with a pie allocation problem to users, who are divided into sharing groups, that are not necessarily disjoint. The pie is allocated among the groups, rather than the users. The portion of a sharing group is a public good for its members, that is, all of them can enjoy it. A non-cooperative game for allocating the pie and a special equilibrium outcome, strongly disappointment-free allocation, are defined. We prove the existence of a unique such allocation and show that it coin...
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作者：Ruffle, BJ
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：This paper examines Allocators' willingness to reward and punish their paired Recipients. Recipients only compete in a skill-testing contest, the outcome of which determines the size of the surplus. In the dictator game, Allocators reward skillful Recipients, but punish unskillful ones only modestly. The punishment effect is mitigated by the belief held by some Allocators that effort is the appropriate measure of deservingness. The ultimatum game extension reveals offerers' ability to adapt to...
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作者：Arin, J; Inarra, E
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：This paper presents a characterization of the nucleolus in terms of partitions and anti-partitions for convex games. The results used in this characterization are applied to bankruptcy games. The characterization is easily derived in a procedure for computing the nucleolus for convex games. This procedure is shortened by a method that disregards irrelevant partitions and anti-partitions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Friedman, JW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
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作者：Samet, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present belief; only. A common prior exists iff for each random variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. The proof is based on the presentation of type functions as Markov matrices. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles such that (1) players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts and (2) forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning process involving (vanishing) trembles. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Robson, AJ
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper considers a class of naive adaptive learning rules in a social setting. They generalize biological selection and have become relevant in economic theory as a consequence of their use in evolutionary game models. The environment considered here is nonstrategic but includes gambles which are more or less completely observed in each period. In the long run, individuals are more averse to a gamble which is less observable, other things being equal, and may violate first-order stochastic...
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作者：Chatterjee, K; Lee, CC
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is wors...
