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作者：Izquierdo, JM; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (TU.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set A la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set a la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：de Frutos, MA
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. We provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. Comparative statics are developed, especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions....
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作者：Alós-Ferrer, C; Ania, AB; Schenk-Hoppé, KR
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper presents an evolutionary model of Bertrand competition in a market for a homogeneous good, where identical firms face a technology with decreasing returns to scale. Only quoted prices and realized profits are observed. The behavior of firms is based on imitation of success and experimentation, and is formally modeled through behavioral principles. We find that, even under simple behavior, the dynamic process selects a strict subset of the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. In t...
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作者：Rinott, Y; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara
摘要：How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. in this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that differen...
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作者：Ponti, G
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies the evolutionary properties of the Centipede Game. For this game, the use of backward induction as a model of rational behavior has been consistently challenged by the experimental evidence. Our claim is that backward induction can still accurately predict the players' behavior, provided that they are given time enough to appreciate the strategic environment in which they operate. We support this claim by proving convergence to the backward induction solution for all continu...
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作者：Hartman, BC; Dror, M; Shaked, M
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Arizona
摘要：Consider a set of n stores with single-item and single-period demands. Assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty casts only. In this case, a cooperative inventory centralization game defines' allocations of the cost. We examine; the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core. We prove the existence of nonempty core far demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal...
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作者：Banerjee, A; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games and specifically characterizes the set of neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. With a finite message set, this set is finite. As the number of messages goes to infinity, the set expands toward a countable limit. The Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoff is its unique cluster point. By contrast, the corresponding limit set of strategically stable outcomes is dense in the interv...
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作者：van Gellekom, JRG; Potters, JAM; Reijnierse, JH; Engel, MC; Tijs, SH
作者单位：Radboud University Nijmegen; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper we study linear production processes. The maximal profit that can be made has to be divided among the agents in a fair way. G. Owen (1975, Math. Programming 9, 358-370) assigned to every linear production process a cooperative game, a linear production game, and introduced a method to find a subset of the core of linear production games, which we call the Owen set. In the first part of the paper we give an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set. In the second part we study th...
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作者：Bhaskar, V
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria-the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk-dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the playe...
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作者：Neyman, A; Okada, D
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer's strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the bound eta(n), a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition eta(n)/n --> gamma (n --> infinity), then the maxmin value W-n(eta(n)) converges to (cav U)(gamma), the concavification of the maxmin value of the stage game in which the maximizer's act...
