Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Bhaskar, V
署名单位：
University of Essex
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2000.0810
发表日期：
2000
页码：
247-262
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria-the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk-dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the players are sufficiently impatient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73. (C) 2000 Academic Press.