On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Rinott, Y; Scarsini, M
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California San Diego; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0775
发表日期：
2000
页码：
274-293
关键词：
摘要：
How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. in this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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