Average monotonic cooperative games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Izquierdo, JM; Rafels, C
署名单位：
University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0820
发表日期：
2001
页码：
174-192
关键词：
摘要：
A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (TU.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set A la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set a la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. (C) 2001 Academic Press.