Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, A; Weibull, JW
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0756
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 1-24
• 关键词: Coordination games; cheap-talk games; evolutionary stability; neutral stability

摘要

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games and specifically characterizes the set of neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. With a finite message set, this set is finite. As the number of messages goes to infinity, the set expands toward a countable limit. The Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoff is its unique cluster point. By contrast, the corresponding limit set of strategically stable outcomes is dense in the interval spanned by the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the underlying game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70. (C) 2000 Academic Press.