Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
de Frutos, MA
署名单位：
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0772
发表日期：
2000
页码：
48-71
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. We provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. Comparative statics are developed, especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions. Classification Numbers: C72, D39, D44, D52, D74, D82. (C) Academic Press.
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