Cycles of learning in the centipede game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ponti, G
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0707
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 115-141
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; backward-induction; MONOTONICITY; replicator dynamics with drift

摘要

This paper studies the evolutionary properties of the Centipede Game. For this game, the use of backward induction as a model of rational behavior has been consistently challenged by the experimental evidence. Our claim is that backward induction can still accurately predict the players' behavior, provided that they are given time enough to appreciate the strategic environment in which they operate. We support this claim by proving convergence to the backward induction solution for all continuous-time monotonic selection dynamics. However, we also show that this solution is intrinsically unstable, and how this instability is positively related to the length of the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C79. (C) 2000 Academic Press.