Repeated games with bounded entropy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Neyman, A; Okada, D
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0725
发表日期：
2000
页码：
228-247
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer's strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the bound eta(n), a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition eta(n)/n --> gamma (n --> infinity), then the maxmin value W-n(eta(n)) converges to (cav U)(gamma), the concavification of the maxmin value of the stage game in which the maximizer's actions are restricted to those with entropy at most gamma. A similar result is obtained for the infinitely repeated games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C72. (C) 2000 Academic Press.