A model of the origins of basic property rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Muthoo, A
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.008
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 288-312
• 关键词: Property rights; state-of-nature; natural equilibrium; Self-enforcement; inter-player transfers of output; incentive-compatible agreements

摘要

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.