Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burton, A; Sefton, M
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00115-5
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 23-40
• 关键词: experimental games; COMMUNICATION; cheap talk; equilibrium

摘要

We report an experiment with a 3 x 3 game with a unique and efficient equilibrium. However, each player's equilibrium strategy may result in a very low payoff if the other player does not use her equilibrium strategy. Players can avoid this possibility by playing an alternative safe strategy. When players have no opportunity for pre-play communication over 80% of subjects choose the safe strategy. However, we observe substantial increases in the amount of equilibrium play when (i) the riskiness of the equilibrium strategy is reduced, and (ii) subjects have opportunities to send non-binding, costless, messages to one another prior to playing the game. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.