Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kukushkin, NS
署名单位：
Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.007
发表日期：
2004
页码：
94-110
关键词：
摘要：
If in a finite strategic game all strategies axe scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners' choices, and one of three single crossing conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a Nash equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.