An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kirchkamp, O; Moldovanu, B
署名单位：
University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2002.02.001
发表日期：
2004
页码：
54-85
关键词：
摘要：
We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals. Theoretically, the English auction yields efficient allocations, while other standard auction formats fail to do so. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that an English auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second-price sealed-bid auction. We also study the seller's expected revenue and the bidders' expected profits, and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.