Successful uninformed bidding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hernando-Veciana, A
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geeb.2003.09.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 29-53
• 关键词: Multi-unit auctions; Common value; Asymmetric bidders

摘要

This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with mort information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.