Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Deneckere, Raymond; Severinov, Sergel
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Essex
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006
发表日期：
2008
页码：
487-513
关键词：
摘要：
We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending it message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages. we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, static mechanisms no longer suffice. If a 'punishment' allocation exists for each agent. then implementable allocations can be characterized as equilibria of a Revelation Game, in which agents first select front the Menus Of allocation rules. then the mediator requests each agent to send some verifying messages. When a punishment allocation fails to exist for some agent, dynamic games in which agents gradually reveal their evidence implement, a larger set of outcomes. The latter result provides a foundation for it theory of debate. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.