Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Satterthwaite, Mark; Shneyerov, Artyom
署名单位：
Northwestern University; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Concordia University - Canada
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.014
发表日期：
2008
页码：
435-467
关键词：
摘要：
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers' values for the traded good are private and independently drawn. Time is discrete, each period has length 3, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate. We show that in all steady state, perfect Bayesian equilibria, as delta approaches zero, equilibrium prices converge to the Walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.