A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chang, Chih; Hu, Cheng-Cheng
• 署名单位: Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 133-144
• 关键词: bankruptcy problem; f-just rule; bilateral consistency; Converse consistency

摘要

First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.