Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herold, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.010
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 542-551
• 关键词: Evolution of preferences; observability; DISCRIMINATION; STABILITY

摘要

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.