Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rutstroem, E. Elisabet; Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 616-632
• 关键词: Stated beliefs; Inferred beliefs; repeated games; Experimental methods

摘要

Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally Verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that inferred beliefs (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the stated beliefs from scoring rule belief elicitation. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.