Equilibrium vengeance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, Daniel; Singh, Nirvikar
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 813-829
• 关键词: reciprocity; Vengeance; Evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Social dilemmas

摘要

The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types Survive and reap mutual gains. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.