Optimal auctions with information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shi, Xianwen
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.015
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 666-686
• 关键词: optimal auctions; information acquisition; Rotation order

摘要

This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering. We develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers, who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation in the auction. We first demonstrate that the optimal mal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price. We then show that standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal among symmetric mechanisms, but the optimal reserve price lies between the ex ante mean valuation of bidders and the standard reserve price in Myerson (1981). Finally, we show that the optimal asymmetric mechanism softens the price discrimination against strong bidders. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.