A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hafalir, Isa E.; Ravi, R.; Sayedi, Amin
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 699-708
• 关键词: Vickrey auctions; budget constraints

摘要

In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense that all full winners' values are above all full losers' values. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.