Authority and communication in the laboratory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Lehigh University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 541-560
• 关键词: Cheap-talk communication; Decision-making authority; DELEGATION; laboratory experiment; Level-k model

摘要

We report findings from experiments on two delegation-communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed in another game in which the delegation outcome payoff-dominates the unique babbling communication outcome; yet there is a non-negligible fraction of principal-subjects who holds on to their authority and agent-subjects who transmits some information. A level-k analysis of the game indicates that a principal-subject under-delegates due to the belief that her less-than-fully-strategic opponent will provide information; such belief is in turn consistent with the actual play. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.