Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ispano, Alessandro; Schwardmann, Peter
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 329-348
• 关键词: Traveler's dilemma; Loss domain; Diminishing sensitivity; Strategic sophistication

摘要

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler's dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Furthermore, our results suggest that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-dependent strategic sophistication. We discuss the implications of our results and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.