Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 517-534
• 关键词: Shared intentions; collaboration; EVOLUTION; game theory

摘要

The ability to form shared intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that act for and against the evolution of this ability. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, for large classes of games the ability to form shared intentions proliferates when rare without requiring group selection or assortativity in matching. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.