At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wilson, Alistair J.; Wu, Hong
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 487-507
• 关键词: outside options; Endogenous termination; Dissolution clauses; Imperfect public monitoring; dynamic games

摘要

We theoretically and experimentally examine the effects from adding a simple, empirically relevant action to a repeated partnership, the option to walk away. Manipulating both the value of the outside option, and its relative distribution among the partners, we examine the behavior of human subjects in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. In particular, we examine the degree of cooperation and the form of punishments used. Our findings indicate that cooperation rates are broadly unaffected by the value of the common outside option, but that the selection of supporting punishments in-relationship defections or walking-away are dictated by individual rationality. In contrast to the symmetric results, when outside options for partners are asymmetric we find stark selection effects over cooperation, with the potential for very high and very low efficiency, dependent on the precise division rule. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.