How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Palfrey, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard; Roy, Nilanjan
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; New York University; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 234-259
• 关键词: communication; cheap talk; Message space; Public Good Provision

摘要

This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effects of communication in a threshold public goods game. Individuals have private information about contribution costs. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are achieved. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.