The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Platz, Trine Tornoe; Osterdal, Lars Peter
• 署名单位: University of Southern Denmark; Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 165-176
• 关键词: Queue discipline; Nash equilibrium; FIFO; LIFO; welfare; congestion

摘要

We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in-first-out queue discipline and the last-in-first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in-first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility and welfare, while the last-in-first-out performs the best. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.