Unanimous rules in the laboratory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Malherbe, Frederic
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 179-198
• 关键词: Unanimity rule; Veto power; Constructive abstention; information aggregation; laboratory experiments; framing

摘要

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.