A must lie situation - avoiding giving negative feedback

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina; Saccardo, Silvia; Tausch, Franziska
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; University of Gothenburg; Carnegie Mellon University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 445-454
• 关键词: Lying; feedback; overconfidence; updating; laboratory experiment

摘要

We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.