A note on pre-play communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 477-486
• 关键词: communication; dominance; equilibrium selection

摘要

Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of monotonic strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.