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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper rehabilitates a program initiated in Aumann (1974) by contributing a result to the theory of finite-player Bayesian games in environments that explicitly include correlated information. An equivalence theorem offers conditions under which the set of mixed-strategy equilibrium payoffs in a classical finite-action game of complete information coincides with the set of objective pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) expected payoffs in an affiliated Bayesian game with type-independent ...
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作者：Britz, Volker
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In non-cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of Rubinstein, the proposer's bargaining power stems from the prospect of a delay in case of disagreement. Since players are impatient, this delay is costly for everyone. We consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose the length of this delay. We assume that the size of the surplus depends endogenously on the chosen length of the prospective delay. Intuitively, the proposer faces the following trade-of...
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作者：Levine, David K.
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作者：Ispano, Alessandro
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：An interested party who controls both the acquisition and the transmission of information may find it optimal to disclose her evidence even when it is unfavorable. At the same time, the public does not necessarily make better decisions when there is more disclosure. The model provides a rationale for voluntary adverse announcements such as product recalls and earning warnings and implications for disclosure laws. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sperisen, Benjamin
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：This paper studies incomplete information games where players observe only a summary statistic of the history, including reputation games as a special case. A recursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set is derived for the case where time is observable, relating it to a self-generating set of tuples that capture equilibrium behavior and pay offs. With unobservable time, equilibria have a particularly simple interpretation as self generating points. The tools are applied to a produc...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium efficiently, namely, in time that is polynomial in the number of players n. Here we show that both randomization and approximation are necessary: no efficient deterministic algorithm can reach even an approximate correlated e...
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作者：Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S subset of N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d((theta) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of d(S) across all the coalitions that include the player. Games of thr...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions...
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作者：Fonseca, Miguel A.; Peters, Kim
作者单位：University of Exeter; Universidade do Minho; University of Queensland
摘要：The fact that gossip can be inaccurate, intentionally or otherwise, has led to questions over its ability to build cooperation in large societies. We explore the impact of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized, two-player trust games. We observed non-trivial levels of spontaneous inaccuracy in gossip, and there was evidence that this was largely due to gossipers' desire to punish untrustworthy players. Although this endogenous inaccuracy did not adv...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：No trade theorems establish that, in various trading environments, investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation, as long as expected utility, Bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed. We relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges. We find that if common knowledge is assumed (as in the settings of Aumann, 1976 and Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), unawareness cannot generate speculation....
